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RECENT DECISIONS
disclosure was necessary to prevent the drying up of sources
of information. No such limitation is applicable to individual
conscientious objectors. In the last analysis secret government
reports may not only deny them. the privilege of staying out of
the armed forces, but the right to stay out of jail
Edward Schmitt
TORT--SUPREME COURT EXTENDS IMMUNITY FOR
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION TO GOVERNMENT
MANUFACTURING
Plaintiffs instituted proceedings under the Federal Tort
Claims Act to recover damages resulting from the alleged neg-
ligently caused explosion of fertilizer which was part of the Gov-
ernment's foreign aid program. Held (4-3): The acts of the
government in formulating and carrying out the plan for the
manufacture of such fertilizer were acts of discretion not result-
ing in liability. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953).
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2678,
2680 (1946) authorizes tort suits against the Government under
circumstances where a private person would be liable. It allows
an exception in the case of discretionary functions whether or
not the discretion be abused. 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a).
From its legislative history the purpose of the exception
appears to be twofold: (1.) to allow the government regulatory
agencies to remain free from the claims of individuals effected
by them, and (2.) to preclude the possibility of testing by tort
action the validity of authorized government projects where no
negligence is involved. Hearings before Committee on Judiciary
on H. B. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1942).
In the absence of any concise definition of discretionary func-
tion in either the statute itself or the .legislative history, resort
must be made to the cases in which the defense was raised.
In cases involving government projects, the following acts
have been held within the discretionary exception even when
negligence was alleged: failure to mark a high tension wire,
Thompson v. U. S., 111 F. Supp. 719 (D. 11d. 1953); spraying trees
on government property, Harris v. U. S., 106 F. Supp. 298 (E. D.
Okla. 1952); planting a tree at experimental station, Toledo v.
U. S., 95 F. Supp. 838 (D. P. R. 1951); construction of dam,
North v. U. S., 94 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1950); protection of
migratory birds, Sickman v. U. S., 184 F. 2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950);
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blasting while deepening the Mississippi River, Boyce v. U. S.,
93 F. Supp. 866 (S. D. Iowa 1950); releasing impounded water,
Olson v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 150 (D. N. D. 1950); changing the course
of the Missouri River, Coates v. U. S., 181 F. 2d 816 (8th Cir.
1950); and erecting dikes in the Missouri River, Thomas v. U. S.,
81 F. Supp. 881 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
Similarly, where the acts or decisions of administrative
agencies or officials were the basis of the complaint, the exception
was upheld in these instances: information given by the Weather
Bureau, Western Mercantile Co. v. U. S., 111 F. Supp. 799 (W. D.
Mo. 1953); investigation by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Schmidt v. U. S., 198 F. 2d 32 (7th Cir. 1952); refusal to
issue permit to cross public lands, Chournos v. U. S., 193 F. 2d
321 (10th Cir. 1951); failure of Secretary of Interior to operate
coal mine, Old King Coal Co. v. U. S., 88 F. Supp. 124 (S. D. Iowa
1949); release of psychotic patient by Veteran's Administration,
Kendrick v. U. S., 82 F. Supp. 430 (N. D. Ala. 1949); and failure
to provide ambulance for service man's wife, Denny v. U. S., 171
F. 2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).
Another line of cases maintains that while discretionary acts
are immune in so far as they may or may not be undertaken, once
they are undertaken, due care must be exercised, e.g.: failure to
provide proper guards and warning signals at road block, Her-
nandez v. U. S., 112 F. Supp. 369 (D. Hawaii 1953); negligent
treatment, of patient admitted to government hospital, U. S. v.
Gray, 199 F. 2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952); negligent marking of a
wrecked vessel, Somerset Seafood Company v. U. S., 193 F. 2d
631 (4th Cir. 1951); negligent maintenance of irrigation pipe line,
Ure v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 779 (D. Ore. 1950); refusal to cancel
prior grazing permit, after granting the successor exclusive use
of the land, Oman v. U. ., 179 F. 2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949); inten-
sive grilling of a witness by an army sergeant, Hambleton v. U. S.,
87 F. Supp. 994 (W. D. Wash. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 185
F. 2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950); and failure to exterminate rats in gov-
ernment leased apartment houses, Maryland v. Manor Real Estate,
176 F. 2d 414 (4thCir. 1949).
In the instant case which comes before the court with a finding
of negligence, both the majority and the minority agreed that
the decision of Congress to initiate the foreign aid fertilizer pro-
gram was discretionary and not subject to liability. However,
disparity arose when the majority took the position that immunity
should be extended to the formulation of the manufacturing plan
and its execution. The minority felt this went far beyond the
legislative intent which was to protect the government in its
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governmental capacity. They maintained that when the gov-
ernment engages in activity indistinguishable from private con-
duct, it should be held to the same standard of care as that of
private persons under like circumstances.
The cases holding the government liable for any negligence
occurring once discretion has been exercised follow a sounder ap-
proach as discretion should not include the right to act negli-
gently. It is submitted that the court's refusal to adopt this
reasoning in the instant case may have been prompted by the
enormity of the damages involved and a reluctance to set a prece-
dent of government liability for its part in a large scale disaster.
Anthony J. Vaccaro
WIAS--REVOCATION BY WRITING ON
UNEXECUTED COPY
Upon the death of testatrix an unexecuted carbon copy of her
original will was found at her home. In the blank space, above
the typewritten words of this copy, she had written "Null and
Void" and signed her initials. Held (5-1): This was a sufficient
writing to revoke her original will. In re Kehr's Estate, - Pa.
95 A. 2d 647 (1953).
The Statute of Wills provides that a written will can be re-
voked:
(1) by being burnt, torn, obliterated or destroyed with the intent
and for the purpose of revocation by the testator himself, or
(2) by some other writing of the testator declaring the same and
executed in the manner required of wills, or
(3) by a subsequent will PA. WILLs ACT OF 1947, 20 P. S. § 180.5;
N. Y. DECEDEXT ESTATE LAw § 34.
Where the revocation is by obliteration of the document,
words indicating an intent to revoke which are written across the
will, in such a manner that many words are crossed, effectuates
cancellation of the will. In re Barnes Will, 76 Misc. 382, 136
N. Y. Supp. 940 (Surr. Ct. 1912). However, words written upon
the will which do not in any way physically obliterate the same
are ineffective as a cancellation of the will. Howard v. Hunter,
115 Ga. 357, 41 S. E. 638 (1902); Dowling v. Gilliland, 286 Ill.
530, 122 N. E. 70 (1919).
Writing across the words of an unexecuted copy of a will
is ineffective as a cancellation of the original. In r6 D'Agostino's
Will, 9 N. J. Super. 230, 75 A. 2d, 913 (1950). However, where a
